INTENTIONALITY OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS IN RICOEUR’S CONTEXT

Cristina-Georgiana Voicu

PhD, Post-PhD Fellow, SOP HRD/159/1.5/S/133675 Project, Romanian Academy, Iași

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Abstract: This article addresses the self as a form of awareness (momentary consciousness), of the whole existential-intentional horizon. Based on the fictional self model as a basis to define the real self, the narrative theory of the self proposed by me and the perspective of identity theory exposed by Paul Ricoeur through the concept of intentionality, offers a reinterpretation and updating of the ontological issue of the self as well as an explanation of its narratological structure. Through self-awareness and moral knowledge of self as an intent of the narrative act manifested in various areas of authorial convergence, the self expertise tries to capture the fundamental aspect of the narrative self according to the theory of intentionality in that the subject endows itself with the mind of an intentional agent, i.e. Ricoeur’s philosophy of action, distinct from the intentional mental events that take place inside the self.

Keywords: Intentionality, Subjectivity, Self-consciousness, Narrative self, Philosophy of action

1. Introduction

Starting from the central insight into the intentionality of self-consciousness, we argue that human beings are capable of facing double consciousness: inward (constructive\(^1\) consciousness

\(^1\) Constructive consciousness is awareness in action, a field of the present and of our presence in the world. It involves the individual separation from the world and others.
as an unconscious act or objectual intentionality) and outward (explicit/reflexive\(^2\) consciousness as a conscious act or reflexive intentionality as self-orienting). People are aware of themselves and of what is going on around them in terms of cognitive-intentional experiences. They have the power to interact (or to “intend” according to Husserl) with themselves and the world in which they live (alteritarian intentionality, directed towards the other). For Husserl, the intuitive ground is captured, being intentionally integrated, its manifestation combining with the intentionality of consciousness transcendentally structured.

In this regard, Husserl’s notion of intentionality is based upon the statement that consciousness is always consciousness of something, or of itself. From this, a particular problem arises from the question of objectivity to which Ricoeur’s theory of narrative offers a response. When Husserl shows that consciousness is linked to something, he means that a person grasps something real as do all other people. Husserl, however, never properly integrates such an intersubjective perspective into the ultimate statement of intentionality. As Husserl always perceives the intimate self as the source of concrete proof, the external world\(^3\) gives us the impression of being reduced to the symbolic acts of consciousness.

Ricoeur obviously overcomes this issue by focusing on that of linguistic mediation. What Ricoeur points out is the fact that our worldly intentions are already upheld by a degree of cultural achievement. The considered subject is not, therefore, an intimate self reflecting to the best suited expression used for what is intended. Intentions themselves are based on a social context or a culture under the form of narratives. Texts or narratives encourage and disclose what can be intended. Although this re-examination of narrative mediation\(^4\) answers the intersubjective question, we must nevertheless investigate how the objective world is something more than a simple reflection of locutionary or narrative acts (the act of saying). The narration has a double meaning: firstly, narratives are descriptions which people pass on to each other and secondly, they also speak about reality as they suggest ways to act in the world.

\(^2\) Reflexive consciousness is self-consciousness that responsibly acts and requires the development of the abstract thinking, while asking the existence of an inner monologue.

\(^3\) Its orientation towards an object can be understood in a similar manner to that which Husserl describes it when talking about intentionality of consciousness supporting that it is always consciousness of something or consciousness about something).

\(^4\) As a consequence, Ricoeur directs this mediation towards the concept of intentionality and the space of meaning arousal in the intentionality of consciousness. The challenge resides in the fact that “signification is placed in a different field than that of the intentional aimings of a subject” [1].
Ricoeur includes the theory of action into the notion of intentionality stating that actions are intelligible because of the intentions which pervade them and intentions are matched with the world insofar as they can be acted upon. In this respect, Ricoeur includes an intersubjective element linked to reality through the individuals’ conscious acts\(^5\) into the notion of intentionality. In this article I will explore the concept of intentionality\(^6\) (i.e. psychic phenomenon that belongs to action) both in philosophical and neuroscientific terms. Intentionality (namely, the reference to something else) defines the very nature of consciousness. In his 1991 article Self, Awareness, and the Frontal Lobes: A Neuropsychological Perspective, the psychologist Donald T. Stuss \([3]\) introduces the size of consciousness functions as a related area with the frontal lobes and the self that is the actual topic of the present article along with the momentary consciousness (awareness) as a momentary focus (self-awareness) or the targeting of attention.

The mental / spiritual states are defined by intrinsic intentionality that belongs only to specific mental events (hope, faith, fear, desire, etc.), the disorder or excitement for example bearing no intentionality. Conscious intentions are only specifications of a more profound mental intentionality - biologically grounded. Speech acts - which are just a variety of the human action, as the spirit relates the body to the world, possess an intentionality derived from the intentionality of the spirit. In this respect, the taxonomy of the illocutionary acts (the doing in saying) as a kind of question is operated in this referential to Ricoeur.

2. Material and Methods

Husserl’s model of passive and active intentionality and Ricoeur’s theory of narrativity are examined in order to explore their relevance for this research. Likewise, I will argue that Ricoeur’s work on narrativity and narrative identity is invaluable in grasping ways in which narrative data is intrinsically self-interpretive and expresses self-identity. Husserl’s work will be drawn upon in order to clarify the ways in which our data falls on the continuum of passive to active intentionality. Ricoeur’s notion of narrativity will be referenced to highlight the varying intentional acts that are obvious when a character represents him- or herself as the protagonist of a narrative, established in the research situation through varying modes of self-interpretation.

\(^5\)Consciousness must always be self-consciousness because, as Kim Atkins emphasizes, we always connect with “all of one’s thoughts to oneself as their single logical subject: the ‘I’ whose thoughts they are. It is from the perspective of such an ‘I’ that the unity of a single consciousness is demonstrated.” \([2]\)

\(^6\)Intentionality is always defined as the manifestation possibility of “something” that calls the reality self or the real self. Therefore, the consequence for the concept of possibility is defining it as intentionality.
Ricoeur starts his own project with an attempt to “reveal... man’s structures or fundamental possibilities” by recourse to phenomenological reduction. Although he separates his method, from the beginning, from Husserl’s transcendental reduction, he is however still interested, at first, in the clarification of the fundamental meanings, resulting from a straight and instant understanding (Wesensschau). In case of Ricoeur, the most “instant” Wesensschau is represented by the self-revelation of the human condition as “the reciprocity of the involuntary and the voluntary” [4], where everything which is involuntary has no meaning except for its connection to voluntary acts. While the core of the cogito, understood as the centripetal function of the voluntary act (i.e. “I will”), is in striking contrast to Ricoeur’s later denial of the philosophies of the cogito, the source of his vision on selfhood as open to the Other, and his following rejection from a “perfect” phenomenology is already prominent. Ricoeur puts away his volitional perspective in relation with the Husserlian concept of intentionality which stresses volition as intention. He unlocks the whole intentional thrust of consciousness to that which is different from or something else than cogito. In addition, Ricoeur claims that intentionality comes with consciousness, especially when consciousness is involved with the “other.” Consciousness in this case is a kind of awareness, both of self and other.

Ricoeur’s theory of narrative identity entirely requires the interface between the character’s identity and the narrative that builds it, so the “identity crisis” of the homodiegetic narrator (that juxtaposed method between idem-ity and ipse-ity) leads to its identity diffusion inflicting the loss of narrative features and the destruction of the identitarian self-balance, an imbalance favoring ipse-ity, fracturing the identity and in favor of the emergence of a new hybrid self. At a diegetic level, the confession is a homodiegetic narration containing various recollections of some events, feelings, experiences and obsessions of a fictional narrator, coordinated using the affective memory (i.e. the intentionality of memory⁷), of which a schizoid self is made. Thus, Ricoeur argues that intentionality and reflexivity (i.e embodied consciousness or incarnated reflexivity) should be seen as the capability to enact our corporeal memory⁸. This corporeal

⁷ An individual’s memory is always a memory of something because it moves consciousness towards something.

⁸ Fuchs, Thomas. “Body Memory and The Unconscious”, in Founding psychoanalysis phenomenologically. Phenomenological theory of subjectivity and the psychoanalytic experience, Dieter Lohmar and Jagna Brudzinska,
memory is split into the body-as-event and the body-as-habit. From the intentionality of memory, Ricoeur moves to the “doing of memory” (faire memoire) preparing for the next exploration of the “act of history” (faire histoire). The frailty of memory consists of two key moments: first, the fact that our re-imagination of the past suffers from the unanswerable question if what we re-imagine is a precise representation, an illusion or even a hallucination. This self-doubt produces the suspicion that we cannot always trust what we remember; following that, the mistrust in our own skill disrupts our sense of self. The search for the right balance between remembering and forgetting echoes the central topic of Ricoeur’s context: the need for a balance between the flawed, injured cogito and the efficient, positive self.

As a therapeutic effect, the role of this “self-fiction” is highlighted by the homodiegetic narrator’s intention to form an identity and to get a sense by writing as a way to recover the real self.

3. Results and Discussion

As the phenomenological formulation that consciousness is always a consciousness of something already shows, Ricoeur argues that we need a “third” or other source that actually enables conscious self-reflexivity. He connects the need to understand the intentionality of consciousness with the need to understand the interpretation of structures of meaning and signification; the intentional act can only fulfill (as a becoming of “presence”) its potential in a meaningful articulation.

In analyzing the concept of intentionality within conscious events and literary discourse, the results showed that discursive intentionality selects a particular set of conventions that follows literarity fixed in an aesthetic code of selection of linguistic means, of their ordering, so that the intention in relation to the speech situation to be recognized by the receiver. Paul Ricoeur distinguishes two meanings of the identical: the first involves the notion of permanence while the second involves no immutable core of personality. From the latter, it follows a dialectical relationship of self and of the other with him/herself. The dialectics “de la même et de...”


http://cfs.ku.dk/staff/zahavi-publications/The_Experiential_Self_-_Zahavi.pdf
l’ipseité” [5] is contained in the notion of narrative identity. Any narrative composition is characterized by discordant consistency. It operates mediation between the principle of consistency, required to ensure coherence in the action, and the principle of inconsistency that makes possible the transformation of the plot. The narrative process in which each of us is found, develops an original concept of dynamic identity which reconciles the categories that Locke consider contrary, identity and diversity.

Narrativity is presented as a privileged space of meeting and reciprocal listening, of life fragments from which the character derives its singularity from the fully temporal living unit - that distinguishes itself from another. According to the discrepancy line, this totality is temporary and is threatened by the breaking effect of the unforeseeable events that point it: meetings, accidents. Then, the synthesis consistency - discrepancy is actually that one which by the event contingency in a certain way, contributes to the retrospective need of the history of life, which equalizes the character’s identity [5]. It is obviously that texts are acting on us, the meaning, intentionality and transcendence are applied to the text, that they send beyond them through the language semantics in which they exist showing some ontological commitments.

Paul Ricoeur reveals within identity the duality of selfhood/ipseity (ipseité) and of the same identity/subjectivity/sameness (mêmeté). Ricoeur starts from the concept of Dilthey’s life contextuality, which equates this with the history of life. Narrative theory understands the same identity, seen as the history of life, as a narrative identity at a conceptualization level, this being considered as the identity of the character. The identity of the character stands in the narrative form. In Ricoeur’s viewpoint, identity is characterized by the dynamic concepts: compliance (concordance) and discrepancy (discordance). Following the Aristotelian concept through concordance we mean an organizational concept that coordinates the facts ordering and by discordance we understand the sudden twists that coordinate the events transformations from the beginning to the end. The action creates different transmissions between the different events and the temporality of the narrated happenings. It is characterized by concordance when seen from the inside and by diversity from the outside. For this reason the unity of the act is called the “discordant concordance”. According to Ricoeur, this identity which is linked with temporal stability has two parts: the same identity (mêmeté) and the nature’s ipseity (ipseité). The character’s ipseity (ipseité) comes from the temporal complexity of the character’s life that
distinguishes it from all others. Temporal complexity is interrupted by a number of unexpected events, which are produced by discordance. This concordance-discordance requires rethinking the autobiography, by which character’s identity is formed. The narrative (récit) by building the identity and the identity of the events forms the character’s identity, and this is called narrative identity (identité narrative). The identity of the happenings makes the character’s identity. According to Ricoeur’s standpoint the character’s sameness has its roots in the “time of the world.” In this context the same identity is the identity during the past time. Regarding this it matches with the identity of the object. The nature is not a creation, but rather a building. Stability consists in its closure. From this perspective we understand that nature can contradict its inner tendencies.

The ipseity (ipséité) comes from the inner time of existence. This is a time that does not pass, but with changes it recreates, renews. Each recreation is also a renewal. By continuous converting it changes and remains unfinished, open. “By opening up to others, he is distinct from others and connects with others he really gets to himself.” Next, I will examine how to interpret the notions of ipseity (ipséité) and the same identity (mêmeté) in Ricoeur’s context. According to Ricoeur the same identity (mêmeté) is something that the character can identify with again and again. There is nothing else but stability stemming from the changes. The same identity (mêmeté) may remove from any inner occurrences; it is a time that includes the changes from the outside. But ipseity (ipséité) comes from the outside time of existence which is continuously renewed. The person is itself only if becomes someone else, he/she changes and therefore he/she becomes an open identity.

Previous identity becomes a question mark. The self-assessment starts from an outside perspective; it is self-examined as a third person singular. In Ricoeur’s belief this combination and the opening of the endpoints distinguish autobiography from the literary works. By this open nature, the full life becomes unattainable, that is why we need fictions so as to record events.

Between ipseity (ipséité) and the same identity (mêmeté) the relationship is made using the narrative identity. Personal identity needs linguistic articulation. According to Ricoeur’s statement: “The narrative (récit) while narrating (narrativisant) the character gives that movement, which has stalled within the gathered skills, and in the identification stability. By narrating real life purpose (en narrativisant) the narrative (récit) offers the nature the features of the beloved and honored characters. The narrative identity suddenly gives us the two ends of the
chain: the nature’s stability in time and the self-maintaining. “The narration, the story of our lives’ events is also the trainer of life. On one hand, as an organizing principle of it reorganizes from the perspective of hindsight the events of the past from the perspective and experience of the present, on the other hand as an environment that gives and creates meaning life and combining with each point of the autobiography forms a whole. During the narration we look the past from the present. The recreated story is in a relationship not only with the past but also with the future, so that it determines it. The narration is based on the past but it looks to the future. During narration our previous identity becomes a question. The question is whether the narrative identity matches the identity of the past. Each individual has a history. Most of us are able to narrate this history, which shows us as an individual. During narration we constantly recreate our identity. In the same time, we also rely on our memories while we formulate ourselves again and again, by presenting the events we live our history again. In this context the history of life is nothing but a narrative confession about how we lived our inner times, ipseity, and which are the events that are worthy of conservation.

Being a way of relating to understanding the functions of systems (live or designed by humans) intentionality starts from the premise that they behave as rational. Being considered the most comprehensive intentional system, the self-consciousness is considered, in this respect, a type of naturally selected behavior because of its ability to monitor a complex system as the human body.

For Ricoeur three fundamental and interconnected features of the concept of intentionality are important: object-directedness, self-consciousness and immediate meaning. The intentional character of consciousness, its object-directedness discloses the complex character of the experienced world of humans. The second feature of intentionality that Ricoeur uses in his analysis is intrinsically related to the first mentioned. The fact that consciousness is always consciousness of something not only discloses the objective correlate, but also its subjective correlate, i.e. the subjective dimension of the experience to which the object is a correlate. It is, however, the affective feature of the subjective experience that interests Ricoeur most.

In this respect, with regard to self-consciousness in perception, Ricoeur states:

“What perception does not in any sense include is an explicit judgment of reflection, such as ‘It is I who perceives, I am perceiving.’ But apart from such an explicit
reflection, perception includes by its nature a diffuse presence to the self [...] which is not yet a conscious grasp. It terms of this it lends itself to a more complete reflection which is not an added operation granted onto perception from without, but the explanation of an intrinsic moment of perception. It is this conception of unreflected consciousness which justifies the use of the word consciousness to designate perception itself. As Husserl says, consciousness is consciousness of... Intentionality and consciousness belong together.” [4]

Dan Zahavi offers an explanation to this passage further classifying the relationship between self-consciousness and intentionality:

“As Ricoeur points out the very suggestion that intentionality and self-awareness might be exclusive alternatives - that we are either so preoccupied with ourselves that every connection with the world is severed or so completely carried outside ourselves that perception becomes unconscious - is based on a quasi-special and completely inadequate conception of consciousness. If I am directed toward the outside, I cannot at the same time be directed toward the inside [...]. Thus, self-awareness is not to be understood as a preoccupation with the self that excludes or impedes the contact with transcending being. On the contrary, subjectivity is essentially oriented and open toward that which it is not, be it worldly entities or the Other, and it is exactly in this openness that it reveals itself to itself [...].” [6]

The third feature of intentionality that Ricoeur is interested in is the fact that people’s experiences seem to possess an immediate meaning or what Ricoeur calls the “intentional exteriorization” of discourse. In this case, the exteriority of consciousness is directed towards a meaning, outside of itself. This feature of intentionality focuses on the centrality of meaning over self-consciousness. Intentionality and meaning are thus consubstantial. The intentional nature of the experiences is defined by a pre-reflective continuity between perception and thinking.

Intentionality is the term used by Husserl by way of Brentano to name the ways in which consciousness grasps its objects. The object of consciousness manifests “outside” consciousness and is merely distinguished by, or automatically recorded by consciousness. Rather, for Husserl,
consciousness takes part in the being of the object, because it is there for consciousness. Intentionality includes a particular way and manner of catching the object that depicts a special meaning.

The interpretation of these three features of the concept of intentionality leads Ricoeur onto a path different from that of Husserl. Whereas, Husserl is most interested in clarifying the structures of human experience, such as pre-reflective self-consciousness, i.e. “the minimal sense of self” [7], Ricoeur pays more attention on the immediate meaning of self:

“There is not yet the unity of a person in itself and for itself [...] it is not one person; it is no one. The ‘I’ of I think is merely the form of a world for anyone and everyone. It is consciousness in general, that is a pure and simple project of the object.” [8]

Therefore, consciousness cannot think itself only as far as it thinks as something beyond the pure capacity of thinking. This is, ultimately, the very central concept of Husserl’s phenomenology at stake, i.e. intentionality. But this thought of itself as something cannot accomplish neither in terms of supporting a marked separation between consciousness and what it is shown by reducing the ego cogito at no pure formal identity or of the one which increases so much the intimacy of the relationship between ego and phenomenon eventually getting to completely assume the latter to the former, thus suspending its transcendent dimension (as it happens in Husserl). As I said, in both cases, consciousness is reduced to a mere tautology where the self-reflection cannot articulate.

Moreover, the inclusion of intentionality in neuropsychiatry field was made possible thanks to the development of investigative technology of the central nervous system functions. One of the most difficult concepts in understanding the otherwise much-needed coordination of the Central Nervous System is that of intention (intent) being simply formulated without being analyzed in neurological and / or neuropsychological terms.

Surprisingly, the concept of intentionality was integrated by the experimentalist neuropsychologist Karl Pribram in a broader vision of what he called “brain patterns of the mind” [9]. This approach is still very influenced by cognitive neuropsychology. A very relevant article in this discussion is Intentional Motor Disorders [10]. So, they distinguish two types of
programs: intended and praxis programs. The system components in any of the versions must realize the interaction between the motor system and environment. Heilman and Watson propose Herbert Spencer’s biological theory of hedonism in order to link the intentions to motivation. This connection was necessary in the context of the pathophysiological description intentions activation disorders. Before being analyzed I must do the preliminary indication that according to their opinion, the interrogative pronouns “may reflect the major components of brain organization, at least in humans”. Furthermore, Mortimer Mishkin described a dorsal system “where” and a ventral system “what”, or “how” that satisfy certain praxis programs.

In the following I provide a description of the intentional motor disorders according to the aforementioned systematization. Some clinical categories are well-known (e.g. motor persevering, motor persistence). Others belong to the authors: the defective inhibition of the response (second statement), hypokinesia. The definition of motor persistence is interesting as intentional equivalent of attention disorder called distractibility.

Each entity described is assigned a space for clinical testing that contributes to diagnosis validation and to further clarifications on its clinical or pathophysiology composition. In this respect the authors believe that there is a “superiority of the right hemisphere for intentional processes” to distinguish it from the dominant left hemisphere (the right-handed) for what the authors call “praxis production system” starting from ideomotor apraxia. The authors argue on the basis of largely clinical data, inclusively belonging to neurorehabilitation, but also experimental using the “reaction time paradigm” to disassociate for instance the attention from intention and to demonstrate the intentional superiority of the right hemisphere. Thus, explaining that the hemispheric “dominant” implies the existence of a specialized job or of some representations, i.e. programs, the authors acknowledge / tell us that the evidence for the superiority of the right hemisphere in the intentional control of the motor system is indirect [10] - i.e “mirror neurons”\(^{10}\) or the so-called intentional neurons.

The alternative that the authors propose is that the dynamical order results from various interactions between variables: intentional, perceptual, effectual, fields of external forces, obviously governed by neural structures. Thus, they speak of “collective variables” or more abstractly of “order parameters” that define the structure of coordination.

\(^{10}\)Lavazza Andrea and Sammicheli, L. “Mirror neurons and Free Will”, *Progress in Neuroscience*, 1 (1-4), 2013, pp.51-56. 
A special importance is given to intentional and perceptual parameters. They would engage in neural and mechanical variables according to some common equations, equations of motion, obviously unknown. On the one hand, it is spoken about the emergent properties of the system defined by its dynamic organization, for example in the case of postural synergies. It’s hard to reconcile this postulate of the emergence, which is one of the great merits of the “equations” approach. The authors forget that by putting the label of “parameters” or “variable” to some factors involved in movement coordination without any specification means that we are facing some totally different phenomena that have concerned the theoretical and empirical investigation for thousands of years. The equations of motion takes place in three-dimensional physical space, governed by the laws of classical mechanics, while intentional phenomena are related to introspective properties of the human psyche, which requires a completely different kind of explanation. Only if we refer to the relationship between consciousness phenomena as perception and intention and their turning them into brain states, would ultimately lead to their fulfillment (in the sense that perception can be understood as a motor act).

The concept of being capable to form intent is held as that of neglect or recklessness. However the issue of the intentional action inference is rather of the intention, as in general in its productive sequence the visible action being defined remains open. The ground of understanding (Verstehen) is generally shared in a given culture.

In the transition from normal to pathological within the psychiatric manifestations we can say that the semantic is displaced by semiotic (meaning a closed system of signs, approximately the syndrome) [11]. Losing the connotative qualities, denotative transfer to the language and actions, in our case the Environmental Dependency Syndrome could be perceived as mechanization.

Using the Naturalistic Action Test [12], Schwartz highlights that intent, meaning the activated contingency plans are an integral part of any goal-oriented behavior. However, the intentions do not necessarily imply a conscious voluntary effort (conscious volition) as the temporal organization of the hierarchies that serve the goals (here using the concept of instantiation) [11]. The attention supervision and conscious effort habitual intervene only when the habitual order is disturbed and / or obstacles start to emerge. In this theoretical-descriptive

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framework the importance given to attention is to be signaled. This could not have missed from a theory belonging to cognitive neuropsychology to which an extra statement that says much more than contain explicit denotative references is added. It is about D. G. MacKay’s statement according to which attention is the “perceptive analog of intent” (MacKay cited in Schwartz [13]). The context in which it is cited suggests that intention translates into attention that I could call post-voluntary, so automated during the action performance.

An unexpected contribution to the issue of intentionality as a cognitive integration concept comes from J. Brown’s neuropragmatical version. This is important because it is related to the “clinical neurology facts” and not to the theoretical discussions around the concept. In his article The Nature of Voluntary Action [14] Brown believes that the intentional states are anticipatory phases of the act or perception formation. The intentional state may be an idea, a belief related to preparation for action, but its content can be affective also, such as fear and faith. Understood in this way, the theory of intentionality allows assimilation with the subjective theories of action [15]. Although the latter were especially applied in psychosocial substantiation of this research direction within the “causal action” philosophy of Erklen type, i.e. the natural sciences allow its application in clinical neuroscience. The clinical corollary of intentionality is represented by automatisms12 more commonly described than intention within the coordination study of Central Nervous System [16].

4. Conclusion

To conclude, I state that an intentional state of self-consciousness is always a tripartite state of mind in terms of the structural model of id / alter ego / super ego or unconscious, pre-conscious and conscious as a real existing insertion of consciousness in the world. Their significance does not only take place as an adjustment between inner and outer, subject and object, immanent and transcendent, but appears as an involving relationship in which intentionality exhibits the structured qualities of viable relations through some meta-codes or meta-social languages. The context is one that foresees the intention by focusing on it and the subtext is the one that chooses the ways that will follow as viable options.

Self-consciousness demands the overcoming of a “lived experience” in order to employ the

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12 In what concerns the voluntary intoxication it is possible that this be the result of several automatism performed in a state of mental sub-confusion (i.e. verbal, kinaesthetic, etc.).
default and relational state between object and subject (i.e. “first-person self reference”), with a performing value placed on subjectivity [7]. Hence, the functional existence of a “cogito” (intentio) that embraces self-consciousness leads to a possible development through knowing the intentionality of self-consciousness. From a cognitive Ricoeurian perspective, self-experiences are actually some intentional feelings, “targeted” to something, and not just some neutral experiences.

The unconscious and pre-conscious deny the autonomy of the explicit cogito and includes the implicit cogito, the former being a manifestation of intentionality, namely of the cogito. Since symbols are considered as being intersubjective, the language mediates and limits the cogito, thus scattering the appraisal that consciousness is a self-founding act. Through subjectivity the consciously lived actions are inextricably linked to the intentional aspect of mental acts, thus, intentionality becoming dependent of consciousness [17]. In this respect, any subject / individual’s subjective perception of that feature according to which for example the body appears in a certain way, can be seen as intentionality. On the one hand, between what operates in experience and what is the expertise of experience, there is an inextricable explanation, regarding the conscious or unconscious state of intentionality.

Applying the idea of the intentionality of self-consciousness in the context of Ricoeur’s hermeneutics I tried to offer a new sense of interpretation, a resignification of the interpretation of the intentional act which involves the emergence of a new concept of textuality, where the focus is on the intent of the text (i.e. authorial intention) and the world of the text (i.e. consciousness).

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